The Korean Student Movement in Japan and Japanese Anxiety, 1910—1923 by Ishiguro Yoshiaki
Although most Koreans who entered Japan after the annexation of Korea in 1910
were illiterate workers, Korean students in Tokyo were a source of concern to the
Japanese authorities.  Tokyo-based Korean students were the most vocal opponents of
Japanese colonial rule in Korea.  Student leaders sponsored many meetings and
demonstrations at which they condemned Japanese colonialism and passionately
advocated Korean independence.1) They also urged all Koreans living in Japan to
unite and forged links with Japanese radicals such as socialists, communists and
anarchists.2) In the view of the security-conscious police, the vigorous activities of these
Korean students were a menace to Japanese safety.  Student-sponsored activities not
only reinforced official resentment toward the Korean student community, but also
generated an obsessive fear among them that militant student leaders, angry at
Japanese colonialism, might attempt vengeful acts against ordinary Japanese people.
When Tokyo-based Korean students started the Korean independence movement in
1919 and were found to have been involved in acts of sedition harmful to Japanese
safety, these events appeared to confirm the Japanese élite’s long-standing anxiety and
contributed in no small way to their willingness to believe rumors of Korean rioting
following the Great Kanto Earthquake (関東大震災) in 1923.
Although scholars agree that the responsibility for the mass murder of Korean
residents in Japan following the Great Kanto Earthquake lay in the prejudice and fear
that characterised the attitude of the Japanese ruling class toward Korean nationalists,3)
the issue of the Korean student movement in Japan during the pre-1923 period, which
reinforced such strong anti-Korean feelings, has rarely been the subject of systematic
analysis.  A small number of scholars have examined Tokyo-based student-sponsored
activities during that period, but their analysis does not focus on the question of how
students heightened the unease felt by the Japanese élite.4) This article provides an
analysis of the Korean student movement between 1910 and 1923: how it took place,
and how it reinforced Japanese anxiety, which culminated in the deaths of more than
6,000 Koreans in September 1923.
The Korean Student Movement in Japan after 1910
In regulating the Korean community in Japan, it is Senjin (鮮人) students whose
deportment requires strict surveillance.  They belong to the intellectual class in
Korea, and will constitute the middle class [of Korea] in the future.  Therefore,
their thoughts are crucial to Japanese colonial rule.  Given the recent activities of
these students, many harbour feelings of hatred against Japanese..., and among
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them there are few who do not wish for the independence of Korea.  ..., they get
together, hold meetings..., read newspapers and journals, and study international
relations...  These Senjin students constitute the vast majority (151 people) of
Koreans requiring surveillance (要視察朝鮮人) (212 people).  Most live in
Tokyo.
Naimusho¯ Keihokyoku Hoanka (内務省警保局保安課)
Cho¯senjin Gaikyo¯, vol. 3 (朝鮮人概況第三)、1920.5)
While there can be little doubt that a sense of anger and frustration at Japanese
colonial rule was a main source of Korean student activities after 1910, it is impossible
to dissociate their activism from the environment in which it developed.  There were
two significant events which stimulated the development of the Korean student
movement in the mid-1910s.  One was Japan’s entry into World War I (1914-1918) on
the side of the Allied Powers.6) The other was the infamous “Twenty-One Demands” of
1915.7) Encouraged by Japan’s conflict with Germany in the Far East, and the
increasing tension between Japan and China, Korean militant students became more
vocal in their demand for Korean independence.8) In January 1915, for example, Yi
Tonghwi (李 雨) suggested financial support for Germany, and Song Chinu (栄鎮禹)
argued that if Japan declared war on China, it would be defeated, because the United
States, a country which had great sympathy for China, would enter the war on China’s
side.9) Pak Igyu (朴珥圭) also believed that assistance would be forthcoming from the
United States and concluded: “If we declare the resurgence of Korea before the world,
how will the United States and China intervene?  We should just hope for the earliest
possible disruption of diplomatic relations between Japan and China.”10)
From this time on, a marked increase occurred in the number of meetings and
activities sponsored by Tokyo-based Korean students.  Student leaders managed to
preserve and strengthen a Korean sense of identity among their countrymen living in
Japan.  In late 1915, three Korean students at Meiji University were found to have
smuggled more than three hundred copies of Pak Uˇnshik’s (朴殷植) “Hanguk T’ongsa”
(The Painful History of Korea韓国痛史) into Japan and to have distributed them amongst
other Korean students.11) The Painful History of Korea contained descriptions of Japanese
aggression, cruelty and arbitrary acts in Korea and, in the view of the Japanese
authorities, these remarks aroused and fanned anti-Japanese sentiments among Koreans
living in Japan.  A Home Ministry report cited the comment of Cheng Chongu (鄭鍾
翊), then a student at Meiji University, who read this book and was impressed by the
act of An Chunggcn (安重根): “Due to his patriotic conduct in the murder of Prince Itt
Hirobumi (伊藤博文), An Chunggün won fame and went down in history.  If,
therefore, I remove someone more prestigious than [Prince] Ito¯ , I will win fame greater
than An.”12) A speech made by a Waseda University student, Yi Kwangsu (李光洙),
had stronger appeal, insofar as it provoked even greater official anxiety over the
intentions of Korean students in Japan.  At a student meeting held at the Korean Youth
Men’s Christian Association (Korean YMCA) in Tokyo in 1916, Yi Kwangsu claimed
that although every person had a right to pursue their lives unfettered, Japanese
colonialism denied this right to the Korean people.  He concluded that: 
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At the present time, the Japanese are increasingly migrating to our land.  They
oppress our people and monopolise any profitable activities.  Meanwhile, our
people repress their tears, abandon their native lands where their ancestors have
lived for generations and wander far across mountains and seas to foreign
countries.  Nothing could be more tragic than this.  Nevertheless, the Japanese
government, far from expressing regret, continues to deprive us of all freedom and
power, claiming that its policies are beneficial.  Can we [continue to] tolerate
this?13)
By the late 1910s, these Korean students adopted a more militant attitude.  They
began to assume more openly an anti-Japanese posture, and there were frequent calls
for Korean students to take direct action against their Japanese oppressors.  Typical of
this was a speech made by Chang Teksu (張徳秀) in which he urged his audience to
prepare for resistance to Japanese colonial rule: “If someone  abuses and insults our
parents, family or ourselves, must we keep cool and tolerate it?  As long as we are born
as human beings, we should protect ourselves and take reprisals against those who
assail us.  This is our natural right.”14)
The official response to the increasing student militancy was an intensification of
police surveillance on all activities of Korean students.  In July 1916, the Minister of
Home Affairs, Ichiki Kitokurt (一木喜徳郎), issued the “Internal Regulations for the
Observation of Koreans Requiring Surveillance” (要視察朝鮮人視察内規) to all
prefectural governors.15) This was a set of instructions designed to systematize
surveillance of any suspected Korean dissident or agitator within Japan.  Every
prefectural government was requested to compile a register of these Koreans.  Each
entry was to contain the suspect’s place of birth, occupations, addresses, and other
relevant information such as organizations to which he belonged, rallies attended,
writings and publications, associations with foreigners, and a record of his movement in
Japan and between Japan and Korea.16) The prefectural governors were also required
to send copies of all dossiers that they compiled to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the
Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department (M.P.D. 警視庁) and other relevant authorities.
Despite the intensifying police surveillance, Tokyo-based Korean students continued
to hold meetings and sponsor activities.17) Because of the presence of police officers
and other informers at all Korean student-sponsored rallies, there was a tendency
among the speakers to refer only indirectly to the issue of Korean independence.  The
use of phrases like “the responsibility of Korean students” or “[we Korean] students
should be in the vanguard of the Korean people” effectively conveyed student criticism
of Japanese colonial policies.18) On the other hand, some militant students continued to
publish statements, only to be accused of violating the Press Law 19) and see their
publications censored.  The articles that were censored commonly condemned both
the forced annexation of Korea and the subsequent “military rule” (武断政治) by the
Government-General.  An article entitled “Tell Us of Your Intentions, Japan!” (日本の
真意を知らしめよ), which appeared in the October 1918 edition of the Reform News
(革新時報), was typical in this regard.  The author, who chose to remain anonymous,
accused the Japanese government of forcibly annexing Korea and mistreating the
Korean people.  Furthermore, it urged the Koreans to resist their harsh oppressors: “...
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rather than shedding unnecessary tears or accepting the sort of harsh treatment usually
meted out to slaves or animals, I believe that we Koreans should attempt a reprisal
[against Japan] as far as possible, and develop a retaliatory spirit of patriotism.” 20)
Within four months of this article’s publication, Tokyo-based Korean students
declared the independence of their country in February 1919.  
Independence Movement of Korean Students in Japan in 1919
There were three major factors which exerted influence on the Korean
independence movement in Japan in 1919.  The first factor was an upsurge of various
popular movements for democracy in the host society.  These developments, which
provided the foundation of what has come to be the “Taisho Democracy movement,”
served to explain and justify the Korean independence movement.21) The most
consistent support came from well-respected Japanese liberals such as Yoshino Sakuzt
(吉野作造), then a professor at Tokyo Imperial University.  Yoshino was one of the
most vocal opponents of Japanese colonial rule and his pleas had a particular appeal to
Korean students in Tokyo.22) The second factor, which stimulated the development of
the Korean independence movement, was the speeches of the President of the United
States Woodrow Wilson in support of the principle of national self-determination.23)
For many Korean nationalists, Wilson’s perceived support for colonial liberation
justified their opposition to Japanese colonialism and offered a political and ideological
basis upon which the independence movement could be built.24) The third factor was
the vigorous activities of Korean nationalists and intellectuals in Korea, China and the
United States.25) Their plan to send representatives to the Paris (Versailles) Peace
Conference to appeal for Korean independence prompted Tokyo-based student leaders
to launch their independence movement in Japan.26)
According to government reports, the first discussion of the 1919 Korean
independence movement to occur in Japan took place at a year-end party sponsored
by the Fraternal Association (学友会) on 29 December 1918.27) The issue of the
independence movement was again raised at a rally held on the following day at the
Korean YMCA.  Emotional speeches were made on the subject of Korean
independence, and the students present were encouraged to sacrifice their lives for the
cause.  This was followed by a meeting held on January 6, 1919 at the same office.  It
was concluded that, “The present situation is ideal for Koreans to launch an
independence movement.  Moreover, since our comrades abroad have already
managed to crystallize their activities into an independence movement, we should also
start a campaign in earnest.” 28)
At this meeting, an executive committee of ten members was selected and, after
lengthy deliberations, a plan was agreed upon.  The members decided that a
declaration of Korean independence would be drafted and presented to the Japanese
cabinet and members of both houses of the Diet, and also sent to all foreign embassies
in Tokyo.  This plan was presented to a rally held at the Korean YMCA the following
day and was greeted enthusiastically by the assembled students.  However, in the view
of an increasingly worried police-force, the speeches that followed this announcement
were deemed to constitute a threat to public peace and safety.  Consequently, the
police broke up the rally and arrested twelve Koreans, including all the members of the
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executive committee.  Those at the rally were forcibly dispersed.  This kind of police
harassment was repeated on January 8, when two hundred Korean students again
gathered at the Korean YMCA.  Once again, the meeting was broken up by the police
and two Korean students, who had been identified as organizers of the gathering, were
arrested.29)
Aware of the futility of this kind of open mass meeting in the face of police
harassment, the members of the executive committee continued activities in a
clandestine fashion after their release.  Under strict police surveillance, they drafted the
“Declaration of Independence” (独立宣言書) in Korean, Japanese and English and
wrote the “Petition for the Calling of a National Congress” (民族大会召集嘆願書) in
Japanese.  By February 7, copies of both documents had been printed and, on the
following morning, these were posted to the Japanese cabinet, all Diet members, all
foreign embassies in Tokyo, the Government-General of Chtsen (朝鮮総督府), major
Japanese newspapers, prominent intellectuals, and journalists.  This was followed by a
meeting of about 300 Koreans at which the executive committee declared the
independence of Korea.  Identifying itself with the representatives of the Korean Youth
Independence Corps (朝鮮青年独立団), the executive committee avowed the
legitimacy of Korean independence and warned the Japanese government in the
following way: 
Although we seek the freedom of Koreans through legal means, if we fail to
achieve our objectives we will take whatever action is necessary to gain our right
to exist.  We Koreans, one and all, are prepared to fight to the last man for our
freedom.  ...  We do not have even a single soldier, nor have we the military power
to resist to Japan, but if Japan fails to respond to our legitimate demands properly,
we shall declare a bloody eternal war against it.30)
Following the declaration of independence, the committee read aloud an
“Independence Resolution” (決議文), which (1) criticized the forced annexation of
Korea as something which threatened the existence and development of the Korean
people, (2) demanded that the Japanese government and the Diet should allow the
Korean Youth Independence Corps to call a Korean National Congress whose
resolution would decide the freedom of Korea, and (3) urged that the principle of
national self-determination be applied to Korea and that, to this end, two students be
permitted to attend the Paris Peace Conference.  The final article was a warning to the
Japanese government, which stated that if the government were to reject the above
demands, the Korean people would “declare eternal war on Japan and reject all
responsibility for the tragic consequences of such an action.” 31)
“The Petition for the Calling of a National Congress” was then read.  It stated that
Korea was capable of governing itself and that its independence would contribute to
peace and stability in the East.  In short, the petition urged the Japanese government to
allow the establishment of a new Korean state: “If Japan agrees and supports us, we will
no longer bear any animosity toward it, and make every effort to establish a true
friendship between our two countries.  We will never forget our debt of gratitude to
Japan ...”32)
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These announcements were greeted with great enthusiasm but, in the eyes of the
Japanese police, the gathered crowd had become over-excited.  After the students
rejected the order to disband the meeting, police officers from West Kanda Police
Station rushed into the Korean YMCA and began making arrests.  All the members of
the executive committee and other prominent Korean activists were taken into
custody.33) This was repeated on 12 February, when approximately 100 Korean
students gathered at Hibiya Park to present the petition to the Japanese Diet and elect a
new executive committee.  No sooner had a student begun to address the rally than the
police moved in and ordered the disbandment of the meeting.  Thirteen students,
including Yi Tal (李達) who had been elected as head of the new committee, were
arrested and taken into custody at Hibiya Police Station.34)
The outbreak of a nationwide independence movement in Korea, which began on 1
March of that year, promoted further student activities in Japan.35) While a number of
students were urged by the Korean Youth Independence Corps to return to Korea and
assist in the rapidly spreading nationwide independence movement, others continued
their activities in Tokyo in the face of continual police harassment.36) Eight Korean
students, for example, proclaimed the legitimacy of Korean independence at a meeting
of the Dawn Society (Myenghae 黎明会).37) In addition, Yem Sangsep (廉尚變), a
former Keit University student, contributed an article to Democracy in which he
condemned the Japanese government’s suppression of student activism.  Comparing it
to the Rice Riots, which had occurred in Japan a year before, Yem Sangsep explained
and justified the student movement for Korean independence as a natural expression of
a people’s demand for subsistence.  He also urged the Japanese people to cleanse
themselves of class and racial prejudices so that they might cooperate with Koreans in
their quest to ensure the eternal peace of both peoples.38)
Encouraged by the student activities in Tokyo, a group of Korean students in Osaka
decided to launch their own independence movement.  Osaka-based Korean students
managed to instigate the development of a national consciousness amongst Korean
workers and urged the importance of solidarity among all Koreans living in the Osaka
region.  By March 18, these students, in collaboration with other students in Tokyo,
copied the “Declaration of Independence,” and, on the following day, attempted to
distribute it at Tenntji Park in Osaka.39) But like the gathering in Tokyo, this meeting,
too, was broken up by the police and twenty-three Koreans were arrested.40)
The Response in Japan to the Independence Movement of 1919
The initial response of the Japanese authorities to Korean student activities in Japan
was to intensify surveillance of the whole Korean community.  On February 21, the
Home Ministry issued an instruction to all prefectural governors, which was designed
to systematize the surveillance of all suspicious Koreans.  The prefectural authorities
were required to discourage innocent Koreans from participating in the activities of
Korean nationalists and to minimize contact between Koreans living within their
respective jurisdictions and Korean demonstrators in Korea, China and Russia.41) In
addition, the Japanese government issued, on 20 May, the “Notification Concerning
the Formulation of a List of Korean Students” (朝鮮人学生名簿調製ニ関スル通牒).
This edict requested all local police authorities to complete a survey and register of the
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names of all Korean students living within their respective jurisdictions.42) By means of
this, all Korean students in Japan, regardless of their political sympathies, were placed
under police surveillance.43)
An assimilation policy was also suggested in order to contain the student movement
in Japan.  In July 1919, for example, the General Staff of the Imperial Army in Korea
(朝鮮軍参謀部) compiled reports concerning the Korean independence movement.  In
these reports, the General Staff collectively urged a shift in Japanese attitudes toward
Koreans and encouraged the assimilation of Korean students in Japan with the host
society.44) According to the reports, Korean students in Japan became increasingly anti-
Japanese in their attitudes in proportion to the length of their studies.  It was reasoned
that the condescending outlook, which characterized the attitudes of many Japanese,
was responsible for anti-Japanese feelings among Korean students, and the following
conclusion was reached: “It is necessary to treat Korean students compassionately as
true brothers, so that they will come to love and respect for us.”45)
The shift of Japanese colonial policy in Korea from military rule to “cultural rule”
(文化政治), which took place in the aftermath of the independence movement, further
encouraged policies of appeasement towards Korean students in Japan.46) In November
1920, the old regulations concerning Korean students dating from 1911 were abolished
and replaced with a new code entitled “Regulations Governing Government-Sponsored
Korean Students in Japan” (在日官費朝鮮学生規定).47) Under the new regulation the
Government-General of Chtsen continued its responsibility for the schools and courses
studied (Article II), yet the terms concerning the supervision of students in their daily
lives —— which were found in the old regulation —— were entirely omitted.48) Student
qualifications and the selection process for government-sponsored study in Japan were
also relaxed.  This, coupled with the abolition of the travel certificate system in 1922,
led to an increase in the number of government-sponsored students from thirty-four to
fifty-four between 1919 and 1922.49)
This is not to suggest that the Japanese authorities relaxed their grip on Korean
students in Japan.  In 1920, the Office of the Korean Student Supervisor was abolished
and the responsibility for supervising Korean students in Japan was transferred to the
quasi-official Oriental Institute (東洋協会).50) The Oriental Institute established a
separate section for the supervision of Korean students, called the Korean Student
Educational Bureau (朝鮮学生督学部), which, through cooperation with the Japanese
police and the Government-General of Chtsen, reinforced surveillance and control
over all student activities.  The reasons for this are expressed clearly in a report of the
Government-General which body sponsored these Korean students: 
Among Korean students [in Japan] there are many who harbour unhealthy
thoughts, kindle anti-Japanese sentiments among other students and facilitate their
dissemination.  In fact, at the time of the Korean disturbance (騒擾) in 1919, they
advocated the principle of national self-determination, which provoked the
disturbances inside and outside Korea.  Moreover, it is reported that they continue
to move between Korea and Japan, forge links with futei Senjin (不逞鮮人) abroad,
and attempt acts [of sedition harmful to Japan].  To deal with this behavior, more
surveillance and control [over Korean students in Japan] are required in
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cooperation with the police in Japan.51)
In response to the activities of Tokyo-based Korean students in 1919, the Japanese
press adopted a relatively moderate attitude.  Newspaper articles reported on the
conflicts between Korean students and the Japanese police at the Korean YMCA and
Hibiya Park, but few resorted to the sort of inflammatory terms which would normally
arouse Japanese antagonism toward the Korean students.52) This attitude reflected the
fact that the Korean student movement in Tokyo caused only minor injuries among the
police and did not flare into a nation-wide mass movement.  It appears, therefore, that
Japanese journalists did not regard these student activities as a possible threat to
Japanese colonial rule in Korea.  
In contrast, the independence movement in Korea, which developed into violent
uprisings after the brutal response of the Japanese army and military police (憲兵隊),53)
appeared to the Japanese press as an immediate menace.  The vast majority of
Japanese newspapers adopted an uncompromising and even hostile attitude towards
these events.  They were unanimous in their condemnation of the Korean
demonstrators and argued that the Koreans ignored the beneficial results of Japanese
rule.  
The arguments of the Osaka Mainichi and Osaka Asahi Shinbun were typical in this
regard.  An article in the Osaka Mainichi Shinbun argued that the present welfare of the
Korean people owed much to Japan’s long-standing efforts.  According to the author of
this article, Koreans had gained nothing from their own government before 1910.
Conversely, under Japanese colonial rule their property, lives and honour had been
protected.  Emphasizing Japan’s many efforts to shield Korea from invasion by China
and Russia, and to ensure the welfare of Koreans, the author warned that, if Koreans
forgot what Japan had done for them, they were doomed to a state of degeneration.54)
The Osaka Asahi Shinbun also urged Koreans to compare the political and social
corruption of pre-1910 Korea to the material innovation and development of post-1910
Korea under Japanese rule, and to consider which political system contributed most to
their welfare.55) Citing an article from an English language newspaper, the North China
Daily News (which regarded Japan as “the only country willing and able to lead Korea
toward wealth and prosperity”), the Osaka Asahi Shinbun asked whether “national self-
determination [is] beneficial to the enduring well-being of Senjin?  Senjin must know
that.  We appeal to their self-awareness, and wish they would consider their own
future.”56)
The assertion that Koreans had forgotten the beneficial results of Japanese colonial
rule was expounded by a Japanese language newspaper in Korea, Keijo¯ Nippo¯ (京城日
報).  Established by the first Resident-General Itt Hirobumi (初代韓国統監 伊藤博文)
in Seoul in 1906, Keijo¯  Nippo¯ was an advocate of Japanese colonialism and thus
severely criticized the Korean independence movement of 1919.  One article that
appeared in the March 7 edition insisted that Korean demands for national
independence showed a lack of understanding of Japanese sacrifices for the prosperity
of the Korean people.  This editorial urged Koreans to take into account their own
inability to govern themselves and emphasized the fact that, unless Japan acted in
support of Korean independence, it would have been annexed by an “alien race” (異人
種).  The writer of this article also ridiculed Koreans who optimistically speculated on
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future trends in international affairs: “Koreans believe that after the President of the
United States [Woodrow Wilson] established the League of Nations, even small and
weak countries (小弱国) would avoid the domination of Great Powers, and be able to
maintain their national independence.  How foolish they are!”57) The writer insisted
that national success was simply a manifestation of the “survival of the fittest” (優勝劣
敗) and the principle of “struggle for survival” (生存競争), terms drawn directly from
Social Darwinism.58) In conclusion, the writer warned Koreans, “Ah, [you] pitiful
Koreans !  You are governed by evil thoughts.  ...  Awake!  Awake!  ...  If you do not
have an understanding of the situation of the world, you will be doomed to perish.”59)
Even left-wing journals, which might otherwise have been expected to be strong
supporters of a colonial liberation movement, limited themselves to parroting the
opinions of the more conservative newspapers.  Despite its progressive inclination, the
journal Reconstruction (改造), for example, argued that Koreans were still unprepared for
self-government because: 
Koreans must consider their own abilities.  The current situation in the world is
still incompatible with their idealism.  As long as they are manipulated by
traditional misleading concepts concerning the [Korean] state or stirred by
thoughtless students to commit reckless acts, ... even what they perceived to be
happiness may turn into unhappiness.  The country may return to the old tyranny
[of the Yi Dynasty].  ...  It is important for them to recall internal and external
problems and the wretched standard of living that existed in Korea before 1910.
The Koreans should compare the situation of pre-1910 Korea to the present
situation, and consider what to do now.60)
In the aftermath of the independence movement in Korea, Japanese journalists
manifested another tendency.  They commonly portrayed Korean demonstrators as
dangerous, aggressive, and prone to anti-Japanese behavior.  Characterized as futei
Senjin, nationalist leaders of the demonstrations were alleged to be responsible not only
for fanning anti-Japanese sentiments among the Korean public, but also for terrorizing
the Japanese police, military police, and residents in Korea.  Osaka Asahi Shinbun, for
example, blamed Korean demonstrators in an article headlined “Christians and
Koreans Opened Assault on a Police Station...”61) Similarly, the newspaper Tokyo
Nichinichi Shinbun published an editorial entitled “A Thousand [Korean] Insurgents (暴
民) Attack Japanese Military Police.” 62) Cho¯sen, a daily Japanese-language newspaper in
Korea published under the auspices of the Government-General, denounced the
behavior of Korean demonstrators: “Approximately thirty thousand insurgents,
carrying clubs, sickles and axes, assaulted a [Japanese] military police headquarters [in
P’yo˘ngan-namdo].  Since these insurgents destroyed windows and other things of the
military police, the military policemen opened fire on them, which resulted in
approximately twenty casualties.  A squad commander was seriously injured during the
incident.”63)
The negative images of Korean nationalists projected by Japanese journalists during
this period were echoed in their attitude toward the attempted assassination of the new
Governor-General Saitt Makoto (朝鮮総督斎藤実).  Arriving at the Seoul Railway
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Station on September 2, 1919, Admiral Saitt was greeted by a Korean patriot who
threw a bomb at him.64) Although Saitt escaped injury, this incident reinforced pre-
existing prejudices, which resulted not unnaturally in a proliferation of anti-Korean
editorials.  In an article published on 4 September, Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun claimed
that Korean nationalists, realizing the futility of the demonstrations in the face of the
Japanese forces, had decided to achieve their goal by killing high-ranking Japanese
officials.65) The same article also sought to attribute rebellious tendencies in the Korean
character to conditions during the Choso˘n period (李朝時代 1392-1910): “As a result of
long-standing sufferings under the cruel tyranny [of the Chosen government], Koreans
became cunning, and are prone to murder...”66) Similarly, Tokyo Asahi Shinbun
condemned the attempted assassination of the Governor-General as an act of returning
evil for good,67) and the daily newspaper Yorozucho¯ ho¯ (萬朝報) urged a vigorous
response to seditious acts of this kind.  The writer of the Yorozucho¯ho¯ reasoned that
Koreans tended to adopt cowardly means (卑怯な手段) and that their ways of thinking
and acting were unimaginable [for the Japanese].68) Koreans were thus portrayed as
inferior and morally culpable.
Japanese citizens in Korea were particularly given to viewing Korean demonstrators
as dangerous and virulently anti-Japanese.  The vigorous activities of the Korean
people for national independence increased Japanese resentment and heightened
tensions between Japanese citizens living in Korea and the general Korean population.
According to Pak Uˇnshik, Japanese residents, particularly members of the fire brigade,
not only lent assistance to the suppression of the independence movement, but also
assaulted Korean demonstrators allegedly responsible for rioting.69) Some Japanese, in
pursuit of revenge, used sickles, clubs and even their bare hands against the Koreans.70)
A comment in Keijo¯ Nippo¯ reveals the nature of their behavior: “Given the character of
Japanese people, it is most likely that they perceived the disturbances of Senjin as
impertinent (小癪), and impudent (生意気千万)..., and thus they embarked upon a hunt
for Korean demonstrators.  ... this kind of behavior [by Japanese] is not unusual, for it
had occurred previously...”71)
The Korean Student Movement, 1920-1923
The most notable experience of Korean students in Japan during the suppression of
the independence movement in 1919 was the discovery that the independence of
Korea could not be accomplished without assistance from Japanese sympathizers.  In
the wake of this realization came proposals for closer cooperation with Japanese
progressives and the establishment of left-wing organizations.72) Disillusioned with both
the inability of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai (大韓民国臨時政府) to
provide an effective base for an organized independence movement and the failure of
western democracies to apply the principle of self-determination to Korea,73) Tokyo-
based Korean student leaders sought new supporters for their long-cherished goals, in
addition to an ideological alternative to Wilsonian idealism.74)
Although Korean students in Japan temporarily suspended meetings and
demonstrations after the suppression of the independence movement of February-
March 1919, their campaigns were active again by the beginning of the following year.
On February 22, 1920, militant student leaders gathered to discuss methods of re-
96
activating the Korean independence movement.  At this meeting, they agreed to draft a
congratulatory pamphlet to mark the first anniversary of the March First Movement.
Decisions were also taken to send the pamphlet to the Korean Provisional Government,
and to various parts of Korea in order to provoke another nation-wide mass
movement.75) On March 1, a meeting was held at the Korean YMCA, which brought
together approximately fifty students.  Since, in the view of the police, this meeting
constituted “a threat to public peace and safety,” the assembled students were
immediately ordered to disperse.  When this order was ignored, the police stormed the
hall and arrested four students.  The remaining students proceeded to Hibiya Park,
where they cried “Manse” (万歳).  The police again ordered them to disperse, and,
when this failed, arrested most of the participants.76)
Contact between militant student leaders and Japanese ideologues also increased in
1920.  Government reports frequently cited the increasing participation of Korean
students in meetings and activities sponsored by left-wing organizations such as Sakai
Toshihiko’s (堺利彦) Kosumosu Kurabu (コスモス倶楽部), Takatsu Seidt’s (高津正道)
Dawn of the People Society (暁民会), Katt Kazuo’s (加藤一夫) Freedom League (自由
連盟), and the Japan Socialist League (日本社会主義連盟).77) A report of the Home
Ministry, for example, described this cooperation as follows: “In recent years among
Korean students in Japan who find it difficult to reclaim the independence of their
homeland..., there are some who attempt to make connections with Japanese socialists
and seem to be planning something together...” 78)
Korean student links with Japanese radicals were strengthened with the arrival of Yi
Ch’unsuk (李春熟), a graduate of Chrt University and the former Vice Minister of
Military Affairs in the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai.  In August 1920,
Yi Ch’unsuk entered Tokyo and held frequent meetings with a Meiji University
student, Yi Chcngrim (李増林).79) The two Koreans discussed how to establish a
socialist movement among Korean students and workers in Tokyo.  They also made
contact with Japanese progressives in an attempt to invite them to a Comintern-
sponsored conference scheduled for October 1920 in Shanghai.80) Yi Ch’unsuk was
unsuccessful in his approaches to Yamakawa Hitoshi (山川均) and Sakai Toshihiko,81)
but he was nevertheless able to persuade O¯sugi Sakae (大杉栄) to attend the meeting.82)
O¯sugi went to Shanghai, where he met with Chen Tuxiu (陳独秀) from China, Yeo
Unhyeng (呂運亨) and Yi Tonghwi (李東輝) from Korea, and a representative of the
Comintern.  Together, they agreed to cooperate in future exchanges of information and
communications among socialists in their respective countries, and with the
Comintern.83) Yi Chcngrim continued his activities in Tokyo, and, in the following
year, was successful in arranging cooperative links between O¯sugi’s friend Kondt Eizt
(近藤栄蔵) and a communist group within the Korean Provisional Government in
Shanghai.84)
Meanwhile, a Tokyo-based Korean student group attempted to put the case for
Korean independence on the international arena again, in spite of their previous
disillusionment with the Paris Pease Conference.  In September 1921, this group met to
discuss ways and means to turn the attention of the forthcoming Washington
Conference toward the issue of Korean independence.85) At this meeting, they agreed
to draft a declaration of Korean independence in English, Korean and Japanese and
97
send the English and Japanese versions of the document —— along with copies of a
manifesto —— to the Government-General of Chtsen, the Japanese Cabinet and the
Diet.  Copies of these documents were also to be sent to newspapers in Korea and
Japan, foreign embassies in Tokyo, as well as to universities and Tokyo-based Japanese
socialists and left-wing organizations.  It was also decided to hold a meeting at the
Korean YMCA on 5 November to declare Korean independence.86) In the guise of a
general meeting of the Fraternal Association, approximately 300 Tokyo-based Korean
students gathered at the Korean YMCA in Kanda on the morning of the fifth.  At this
meeting, a Korean speaker urged that Korea, taking advantage of the Washington
Conference, should declare its national independence.  But the police, always present
at large student rallies, quickly ordered the meeting to disperse.  Ignoring this order,
the organizers of the meeting managed to distribute 300 copies of the declaration of
Korean independence.  This document provoked a chorus of Manse among the
assembled students since it declared that: 
A love and longing for peace are emotions natural to all human beings.  The
numerous movements, which emerged after the First World War and were created
for the sake of social justice and humanity in international, national and racial
terms, are evidence of this.  In particular, the present Washington Conference is
instrumental in materialising our purpose.  This organization [Korean Youth
Independence Corps], affirming the path of justice and humanity and acknowledging
the relationship between world peace and Korean issues, gives its blessing to the
complete accomplishment of the objectives of the conference.  World peace lies in
the final solution of the problem of the Far East, and the peace in the area depends
upon a just resolution to the issue of Korean independence.  The principal issues
to be discussed at the Washington Conference are those concerning the coastal
nations of the Far East and the Pacific.  Therefore, we place our absolute belief,
hopes and expectations in this, and, in order to achieve our principles, announce
the following manifesto to the Washington Conference and governments and
people of the Great Powers.87)
Manifesto: 
1. We affirm that the independence of Korea promotes not only the peace in the
Far East, but world peace as well.  
2. The current situation in Korea proves that Japan’s justification for the
annexation of Korea was false.
3. We declare that the Korean people will never realise their full potential under
Japanese rule. 
4. We affirm that, if Japan continues its present policies, this will be a menace to
world peace.  
5. On the basis of the reasons given above, we assert that it is the legitimate duty of
the Washington Conference to discuss and resolve the issue of Korean
independence.  
6. We affirm the duty of the governments and people of the Great Powers to
support Korean independence.
7. This organization approves the conditions in their entirety as presented before
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the Washington Conference by the representatives of the Korean Provisional
Government [in Shanghai].88)
Just like the Paris Peace Conference, the Washington Conference proved a
disappointment to Korean students in Japan, for the assembled delegates failed to act
upon their demands.  The voice of the Korean students was ignored and their hopes
and expectations dashed.  With this, Tokyo-based militant student leaders moved
toward the establishment of radical student organizations in earnest.  In the same
month of the independence declaration, a student group established the Black Wave
Association (黒濤会), which represented the views of both communist and anarchist
movements.  This organization was dominated by Pak Yel (朴烈) and Kim Yaksu (金若
水), to whom prominent Japanese left-wing leaders such as O¯sugi Sakae and Sakai
Toshihiko acted as advisers.89) But its existence proved short-lived.  Owing to
ideological divisions between communist and anarchist factions, the association split in
October 1922 into the communist North Star Society (北星会), and the anarchist Black
Friends Society (黒友会).90)
Established in November 1922, the North Star Society quickly moved to align itself
with both Korean and Japanese workers.  The North Star Society had actively been
involved in the establishment of the Osaka League of Korean Workers (大阪朝鮮労働
同盟会), while urging all the Korean and Japanese proletariat to unite.91) The North
Star Society stated that its intention was to: (1) make it clear that Koreans regard the
Japanese ruling class, and not the Japanese proletariat, as their enemies; (2) strengthen
the joint ideology and solidarity between the Korean and Japanese proletariat; and (3)
establish a unified organization of all Korean workers in Japan.92) The activities of the
North Star Society also included lecture tours in Korea, which aimed at the
dissemination of proletarian ideologies.  In the summer of 1923, Kim Yaksu and Kim
Chongbem, accompanied by Takatsu Seidt, Kitahara Tetsuo (北原龍雄) and Fuse
Tatsuji (布施辰治), toured parts of Korea and, while lecturing on Communism, urged
Korean workers to develop a class consciousness.93) Meanwhile, this organization
managed to forge links with the newly-established Japan Communist Party.  Executive
members of the Communist Party such as Sakai Toshihiko, Yamakawa Hitoshi and
Arahata Kanson (荒畑寒村) were invited to give lectures at general meetings of the
North Star Society.  Katayama Sen (片山潜) characterized this association as a firm
communist group under the guidance of the Japan Communist Party.94) The security-
conscious police described the activities of the North Star Society during this period in
the following way: 
... Korean students have forged links with Japanese socialists who have themselves
recently come into prominence and made ideological propaganda to attract newly
arrived students.  On the other hand, they are agitating for the development of
class consciousness among Korean workers, organising labour unions and
attempting to make use of them.95)
The anarchist Black Friends Society was representative of only a small minority of
Korean students, but, in the view of the police, this organization was more dangerous
and predisposed to violence when compared to the North Star Society.96) This
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impression was mainly due to the personality of Pak Yel, the principal leader of the
group.  Pak Yel was a passionate nationalist, anarchist and nihilist who urged “direct
action” in order to terminate the Japanese domination of Korea.97) Prior to the
establishment of the Black Friends Society, Pak organized a radical unit called the Unit
of the Bloody Fists (血拳団), whose principal objective was the chastisement of pro-
Japanese Korean elements.98) This was followed by the establishment of the Company
of Malcontents (不逞社) in April 1923.99) Bringing together both anarchist and nihilist
elements, the Company of Malcontents held monthly meetings and discussed direct
action against Japanese colonial policies.100) In the meantime, Pak Yel tried to make
contact with two overseas Korean organizations: the Korean Provisional Government
in Shanghai, and a Korean terrorist group known as the Unit of Righteous Fighters (義
烈団).101) According to government reports, Pak attempted to smuggle explosives into
Japan with the assistance of overseas Koreans in order to carry out acts of sedition in
Tokyo in the autumn of 1923.102) Although the smuggling attempt failed because of
police action, the rumored bomb plot, coupled with the attempted assassination of
General Tanaka Giichi (田中義一) by members of the Unit of Righteous Fighters in
Shanghai in March 1922,103) appeared, in the eyes of the Japanese police, to be a direct
threat to the state of Japan.  These suspicions culminated in the arrest of Pak Yel and
his wife, Kaneko Fumiko (金子文子), in the midst of widespread rumors about Korean
uprisings following the Great Kantt Earthquake in 1923.104)
While the activities of the Company of Malcontents had been a source of concern to
the Japanese authorities, Japanese newspapers were disseminating stories of Korean
activities in Manchuria and Korea.  Stereotyped views of Korean ultra-nationalists,
whose behavior was defined in terms of opposition to Japan’s colonial policies, were
contained in terms like futei Senjin.  For example, in an article which appeared in the 4
October 1920 edition of Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun, a series of attacks by a band of
mounted bandits upon Japanese residents in the Chientao (間島) area in Manchuria
were described in the following terms: “Among the mounted bandits who attacked
Japanese people, there were many futei Senjin ...  Different from the old ways of
mounted bandits, they [now] killed even [Japanese] women and children...” 105)
Similarly, the Jiji Shimpo¯ gave the reader the impression that these incidents were not
merely attacks by bandits and concluded that: “... given the behavior of the assailants
who raided the Japanese Legation [in Hunchun (琿春), about 100 miles southwest of
Vladivostok], and murdered many Japanese subjects in the area, it is clear that their
actions are different from the previous methods of mounted bandits.  ...  The reason
was the participation of a hundred futei Senjin and five Russians.”106) Meanwhile, Osaka
Mainichi Shinbun cited copies of petitions drafted by Japanese residents of the Chientao
region in which they requested the Japanese military to occupy the area.  The
petitioners reasoned that excessive violence committed by futei Senjin threatened their
lives and property: “We long for the [Japanese] authorities to take immediate measures
to alleviate our uneasiness.”107)
The press coverage of Kim Iksang (金益相), who had been charged with the
attempted assassination of General Tanaka Giichi in Shanghai, also appeared to foment
Japanese fear of Korean extremists.  According to an article in Osaka Mainichi Shinbun,
published on July 1, 1922, Kim Iksang claimed at his trial that since his parents had
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been mistreated by the Japanese, he had decided to devote himself to anti-Japanese
activities.  Kim also stated that although his attempt to assassinate General Tanaka had
failed, his bombs were capable of killing thirty-five or thirty-six people and that, “If I
had [killed General Tanaka and] fled from Shanghai, I planned to enter Japan and
indiscriminately kill Japanese high ranking officials...”108)
With the exception of the assassination of Min Wenshik (閔元植) (the president of a
pro-Japanese organization in Korea) by a former Nihon University student Yang
Kcnhwan (梁槿煥) at the Tokyo Station Hotel in February 1921,109) the Korean student
movement in Japan, for the most part, remained non-violent.  Nevertheless, student
links with overseas Korean extremists following the independence movement of 1919
heightened the unease felt by the Japanese authorities.  In the view of the Japanese
élite, these activities were a threat not only to the colonial rule in Korea, but also to
their safety.  Thus the Japanese came to believe that militant Korean students who were
angry at Japanese colonialism and the treatment meted out to their countrymen in
Japan would seek revenge against them.  
This view became apparent in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923.
For the Japanese ruling class, the rumors about Koreans throwing bombs, poisoning
wells and setting fires that circulated in the aftermath of the earthquake confirmed their
long-standing fear of militant Korean students in Tokyo.  In other words, when faced
with the reports of a Korean riot, the Japanese authorities were already predisposed to
believe them.  The following extract from Akaike Atsushi (赤池濃), the Inspector
General of the Tokyo M.P.D. (警視総監) at the time of the earthquake, best illustrates
this: “When I received reports that 2,000 Koreans had crossed the [Tama] River and
were committing violent acts in the city [of Tokyo], I was soon convinced that extremists
in the Korean community were fomenting unrest...”110) In the context of the confusion,
Akaike immediately imagined that certain Koreans were the instigators of the reported
riot.  This development drove him to press most emphatically for the imposition of
Martial Law (戒厳令), which came into effect on the afternoon of 2 September.111) The
existence of the Martial Law had a profound impact on the public, for it gave credence
to reports of a Korean riot and effectively drove the people toward Korean witch-hunt.
A Japanese defendant who was tried at a local court of Saitama Prefecture for the
murder of Koreans believed that, if he killed Koreans under Martial Law, he would
receive medals (勲章) from the Japanese government.112)
The Japanese authorities also took the initiative in circulating the anti-Korean
rumors and played a key role in murdering innocent Korean residents.  Members of
the Imperial Army and the police force killed a number of innocent Korean residents
on the street, while they put up posters and distributed leaflets, urging the still
bewildered and incredulous public to be vigilante and to cooperate with the police
since bands of Korean extremists were committing acts of sedition.113) These actions
caused anti-Korean feelings to erupt throughout the Japanese population.  On the other
hand, the military and civilian leadership had also set up temporary “reception centers”
in many parts of Japan for the purpose of safeguarding the lives of Korean residents.
According to a report of the Home Ministry, 23,715 Koreans were housed in these
centers after the earthquake.114) It appears, however, that this “protective custody“ was
confused with “preventive detention.”  Among the first to be interned were those
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requiring surveillance like Park Yel, 115) and in Chiba Prefecture, the Japanese police
committed mass murder of the Koreans in their protective custody.116)
Conclusion
The principal explanation for the anti-Korean sentiments that came to a head in the
massacre of 1923 is that these sentiments were reinforced by the Korean student
movement in Japan.  Between 1910 and 1923, the fear of Tokyo-based Korean student
leaders engaged the hearts and minds of an increasing numbers of Japanese élite.
Their vigorous activism created in the Japanese minds negative stereotypes associated
with Korean students —— that they were dangerous and prone to anti-social and anti-
Japanese behavior.  In the Weltanschauung of the colonial ruler, their resistance to
Japanese colonialism was perceived as a threat to Japan.  The Japanese authorities thus
came to regard the whole Korean student community in Japan in terms of those
stereotypes.  When faced with widespread rumors about a Korean riot in the confusion
following the Great Kantt Earthquake, they were already predisposed to believe that
militant Korean students might rise up and attack them.  Accordingly, they embarked
upon a relentless hunt for the reported Korean rioters.  The mass murder of September
1923 should thus be read as a logical outcome of the Korean student movement that
warped the thinking of many Japanese officials.  
In sum, the Korean student movement between 1910 and 1923 illuminates much
about the mass murder of the Korean residents in September 1923, for it offers unique
insights into the actions taken by the Japanese élite during the first critical hours
following the Great Kantt Earthquake.  The Japanese ruling class was caught up in a
vicious circle of racism.  Their anti-Korean attitudes naturally drove Korean students
into anti-Japanese and anti-social movements, and the development of these activities
heightened, in turn, their anxiety over the Korean student community.  This overt
racial prejudice predisposed the Japanese élite to believe the rumors about Korean
rioting which circulated after the Great Kantt Earthquake.  As Yoshino Sakuzt put it: 
There is a master who has usually bullied one of his apprentices.  The master did
not care much about the apprentice because he was normally an obedient boy.
Then one day, for example, someone set the master’s house on fire.  In this case,
many people will readily believe a rumor of the apprentice setting the house on
fire.  This is natural because they are well aware of his hatred for the master who
has usually mistreated him.117)
End Notes
1) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka [内務省警保局保安課 Japan’s Home Ministry Police Affairs Bureau
Security Section], ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt’ [‘朝鮮人概況 General Conditions of Koreans in Japan’], in
Pak Kyengshik 朴慶植, ed., Zai-Nichi Cho¯senjin Kankei Shiryo¯ Shu¯sei dai 1 kan [在日朝鮮人関係資料集
成第一巻 Collected Materials Concerning Koreans in Japan, vol. 1], (Tokyo: San’ichi Shobt, 1975), 48
(hereafter referred to as ZCKSS).  Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt dai 2’ [‘朝鮮
人概況第二 General Conditions of Koreans in Japan, vol. 2’], in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 62.  Naimusht
Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt dai 3’ [‘朝鮮人概況第三 General Conditions of Koreans
in Japan, vol. 3’], in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 83-7.
2) Shihtsht [司法省 Japan’s Justice Ministry], ed., ‘Naichi ni okeru Chtsenjin to sono Hanzai ni tsuite’
102
[‘内地における朝鮮人とその犯罪について An Account of Koreans in Japan and Their Crime’], in
ZCKSS, vol. 1, 297-8.
3) See, for example, Kang Teksang 姜徳相, Kanto Daishinsai [関東大震災 The Great Kanto Earthquake],
(Tokyo: Chrt Ktronsha, 1975), 9-118.  Imai Seiichi 今井清一 and Saitt Hideo 斉藤秀夫, ‘Daishinsai
to Chtsenjin Gyakusatsu no Kyrmei’ [‘大震災と朝鮮人虐殺の究明 The Examination of the Korean
Massacre and the Great Kanto Earthquake’] in Kanto Daishinsai Gojusshrnen Chtsenjin Giseisha
Tsuitt Gytji Jikkt Iinkai [関東大震災 50 周年朝鮮人犠牲者追悼行事実行委員会 A Memorial Event
Executive Committee for Korean Victims on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great Kanto Earthquake],
ed., Rekishi no Shinjitsu: Kanto Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu [歴史の真実：関東大震災と朝鮮人虐
殺 Fact of History: The Great Kanto Earthquake and the Korean Massacre], (Tokyo: Gendaishi
Shuppankai, 1975), 23-73.  
4) For example, see Michael Weiner, The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan 1910-1923, (NJ:
Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1989), 126-163.  Michael Weiner, Race and
Migration in Imperial Japan, (London: Routledge, 1994), 63-78.  Abe Hiroshi 阿部洋, ‘Kyr Kanmatsu no
Nihon Ryrgakusei (III) —— Shirytteki Ktsatsu’ [‘旧韓末の日本留学生(三) —— 資料的考察 Korean
Students in Japan During the Final Years of the Great Han Empire (III) —— An Account in terms of
Materials’], Kan 韓, vol. 3 (July 1974), 103-128.  Abe Hiroshi, ‘Kaiht mae Nihon Ryrgaku no Shiteki
Tenkai Katei to sono Tokushitsu’ [‘解放前日本留学の史的展開過程とその特質 Historical Review of
Korean Students in Japan before 1945’], Kan 韓, vol. 5 (November 1976), 20-73.  The present study
was unable to refer to an article by Kenneth M. Wells, “Background to the March First Movement:
Koreans in Japan, 1905-1919,” Korean Studies, vol. 13 (1989), 5-21.  To understand the Korean student
movement in Japan before 1910, see also Takekoshi Reiko 竹腰礼子, ‘Kanmatsu no Tonichi
Ryrgakusei ni tsuite —— Hogo Jtyaku ki no Ryrgakusei kai’ [‘韓末の渡日留学生について —— 保護条
約期の留学生界 An Account of Korean Students in the Final Years of the Great Han Empire-Korean
Students at the Time of Protectorate Treaty’], Zai-Nichi Cho¯ senjinshi Kenkyu¯ [在日朝鮮人史研究
Research into History of Korean Residents in Japan], vol. 6, no. 3 (June 1980), 24-42.  
5) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt, vol. 3,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 85.  Italics added.
Senjin is short for Cho¯senjin (Koreans).  Throughout the pre-war period, Japanese, be they officials or
not, commonly used this term in a pejorative way when they referred to Koreans.  Not only was the
word used in government documents and/or any official reports, it also appeared in newspaper articles
and even official journals of left-wing organizations such as the Japan Communist Party (日本共産党)
and the Japan Confederation of Labour (日本労働総同盟).
6) Invoking the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan declared war on Germany on August 23,
1914.  Joining the Allied Powers in World War I allowed Japan to seize German-held territories in
China and the Pacific Ocean and the war-industry boom offered her an opportunity to enter easily
Asian colonial markets, which had been cut off from Europe owing to the war.  See Janet Hunter, ed.,
Concise Dictionary of Modern Japanese History, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 244-5
(hereafter referred to as CDMJH).  
7) In an attempt to consolidate Japan’s position in China, the Japanese government, in January 1915,
presented to the Republic of China a list of twenty-one demands.  These demands included transfer of
former German rights in Shantung to Japan (which already occupied the area), extension of the leases
and privileges in South Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia which Japan had inherited from Russia
in 1905, joint Sino-Japanese administration of the Hanyehping Iron Works, and a Chinese promise not
to alienate any port or island to a third country.  China appealed for foreign support but received little
help because many of the Great Powers were involved in war in Europe.  In May, China finally
accepted these demands.  Although the Japanese government gained considerable concessions, these
demands not only provoked anti-Japanese criticism in China, but also damaged its international
reputation.  This aroused suspicions in Great Britain and the United States.  See CDMJH, 235-6.  
8) News of the conflict with Germany and the prospect of a war between Japan and China also elicited
similar responses among Koreans in China.  See Chongsik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 101-2.
9) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 51.  
10) Ibid.
103
11) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 50-1.  
12) Ibid., 52.  
13) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 52.  
14) Ibid., 53.  
15) Naimusht, ed., ‘Zai-Nichi Chtsenjin Torishimari no Naimusht tt Tsrtatsu’ [‘在日朝鮮人取締りの内務
省等通達 A Collection of Notifications by Home Ministry concerning the Regulation of Koreans in
Japan’], in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 23-5.  
16) Ibid.  
17) Ibib., 87.  
18) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt dai 2,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 72-3.  
19) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt dai 3,’ in ZCKSS,  vol. 1, 94-5.
20) Ibid, 95.  
21) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., Taisht 14 nen 12 gatsu: Zaikyt Chtsenjin Ryrgakusei Gaikyt’
[‘大正一四年十二月：在京朝鮮人留学生概況 General Conditions of Korean Students in Tokyo in
December 1925], in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 324.  
22) See Matsuo Takayoshi 松尾尊兌, ‘Yoshino Sakuzt to Chtsen: 3 . 1 Undtki o Chrshin ni’[‘吉野作造と
朝鮮：3.1 運動期を中心に Yoshino Sakuzt and Korea: The Period of the March First Movement’] in
Yui Masaomi 由井正臣, ed., Ronshu¯ Nihon Rekishi 12: Taisho¯ Democracy [論集日本歴史 12：大正デモク
ラシー Collected Materials Concerning Japan’s History, vol. 12: Taisht Democracy] (Tokyo: Yrseidt
Shuppansha, 1977), 101.    
23) On January 8, 1918, Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States, set forth his Fourteen
Points, in which the principle of self-determination was enunciated.  Although this idea had already
been developed in his numerous writings and speeches, it seems clear that the Declaration of the
Fourteen Points aroused Korean hopes for national liberation.  
24) See Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt dai 3,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 86, 88.
Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Taisht 14 nen 12 gatsu: Zai-Kyt Chtsen Ryrgakusei Gaikyt,” in
ZCKSS, vol. 1, 324.  The influence of the Russian Revolution on the Korean independence movement
in 1919 has been a controversial issue among scholars.  In The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan
1910-1923 (p. 133), Michael Weiner has argued, “While the example set by the Russian Revolution
undoubtedly encouraged anti-Japanese groups operating close to or inside the Soviet Union, there is
no evidence to suggest that events in Russia had any appreciable influence on the activities of Koreans
in Tokyo or Korea.”  On the other hand, Yamabe Kentart’s 山辺健太郎 ‘San Ichi Undt ni tsuite (1)’
[‘三一運動について (1) On the Uprising for Independence in Korea on March 1, 1919, (1)’],
(Rekishigaku Kenkyu¯ 歴史学研究), vol. 184 (June 1955), 6, pointed out the impact of the Russian
Revolution on the independence movement initiated by Tokyo-based Korean students.  
25) Kang Teksang 姜徳相, ed., Gendaishi Shiryo¯ 26: Cho¯sen 2 [現代史資料第二十六巻：朝鮮 2 Source
Materials on Contemporary History, vol. 26: Korea, no. 2], (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobt, 1967), viii-ix, 18-9
(hereafter referred to as Chtsen, vol. 2).  Also see Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin
Gaikyt dai 3,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 99.
26) Dae-yeol Ku, Korea under Colonialism: The March First Movement and Anglo-Japanese Relations, (Seoul:
Seoul Computer Press, 1985), 44.
27) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt dai 3,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 98. Fraternal
Association, which is also known as “Fraternal Association of Korean Students in Tokyo”(在東京朝鮮
留学生学友会), was established in October 1912.  The origins of this organization can be traced back
to the “Greater Korea Association for the Promotion of Education” (大韓興学会), which was organized
in March 1909.  See Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt,’in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 48.  
28) Ibid., 99.  
29) Ibid.  
30) Ibid., 102-3.  The English translations of “The Declaration of Independence,” “The Independence
Resolution,” and “The Petition for the Calling of a National Congress” are cited in Appendix C6 of
Michael Weiner’s The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan 1910-1923, 219-24.  Although all the
English translations of these documents appearing in this paper are my own, I often referred to
Weiner’s translations.  
104
31) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt dai 3,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 103.  After World
War I, the allies held a conference at Versailles, near Paris, which began in January 1919, in order to
decide the terms of a peace treaty with Germany.  See CDMJH, 241.  
32) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt dai 3,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 104.
33) Ibid., 99.  Also see Jiji Shinpo¯, 9 February 1919.  Quoted in Uchikawa Yoshimi 内川芳美 and others,
eds., Taisho¯ Nyu¯su Jiten dai 4 kan: Taisho¯ 12 nen-Taisho¯ 13 nen [大正ニュース事典第四巻：大正十二年
―大正十三年 Dictionaries of Taisht News, vol. 4: 1923-1924], (Tokyo: Mainichi Komyuniksshonzu,
1988), 439 (hereafter referred to as Taisht Nyrsu Jiten).  Of those arrested, the members of the
executive committee were charged with violation of the press law (出版法) and brought to trial before
the Tokyo District Court.  Others were released on February 9.  All the executive members were
found guilty of offences arising from their involvement in drafting the Declaration of Independence,
and, in March, received prison sentences ranging from seven to nine months.  In 1875, the press
ordinance (出版条例) was issued to control popular rights movements.  It regulated expressions of
popular opinions and, in 1893, a new, harsher Press Law replaced the existing legislation.  See
Kokushi Daijiten Hensan Iinkai [国史大辞典編纂委員会 National History Compilation Committee],
ed., Kokushi Dai Jiten 7 kan [国史大辞典第七巻 Dictionary of National History, vol. 7], (Tokyo:
Yoshikawa Ktbunkan, 1988), 390.  
34) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt dai 3,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 100.
35) With regard to the relations between activities of Korean students in Tokyo and the independence
movement in Korea, see Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt dai 3,’ in ZCKSS, vol.
1, 108.  Also see Pak Uˇnshik 朴殷植, (Kang Teksang, trans.), Cho¯sen Dokuritsu Undo¯ no Kesshi 1 [朝鮮独
立運動の血史1 A Bloody History of Korea’s Independence Movements, vol. 1], (Tokyo: Heibonsha,
1972), 131-2.  Yamabe Kentart, Nihon To¯chi ka no Cho¯sen [日本統治下の朝鮮 Korea under Japanese
Colonial Rule], (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1974), 58-62.  In January 1919, at a time when it had
become clear that Korean students in Japan were about to take action, the former Emperor Kojong 高
宗大皇帝 died and his funeral was scheduled to be held on March 3.  Knowing that a large crowd of
mourners would be in Seoul in early March, Korean nationalists decided to stage a nationwide
independence demonstration on March 1.  See Frank Prentiss Baldwin Jr., ‘The March First
Movement: Korean Challenge and Japanese Response,’ Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia
University, 1969.  During the independence movement, a great number of Koreans were harassed and
killed.  In his Cho¯sen Dokuritsu Undo¯ no Kesshi (vol. 1, 169-83), Pak Uˇnshik argued that between March
1, and the end of May, more than 7,500 Koreans were killed, nearly 20,000 were injured, and about
47,000 were arrested, while in ‘Daishinsai to Chtsenjin Gyakusatsu no Kyrmei,’ in Rekishi no Shinjitsu
(p. 142), Imai and Saitt estimated that 26,713 Koreans were arrested and 7,909 killed.   
36) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt dai 3,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 100-1. 
37) Iwamura Toshio 岩村登志男, Zai-Nichi Cho¯senjin to Nihon Ro¯do¯sha Kaikyu¯ [在日朝鮮人と日本労働者階
級 Koreans in Japan and the Japanese Working Class], (Tokyo: Azekura Shobt, 1972), 23.  Inspired by
the internationalism of Yoshino Sakuzt 吉野作造 (a professor at Tokyo Imperial University) and
Fukuda Tokuzt 福田徳三 (a prominent economist from Tokyo Higher School of Commerce), the
Dawn Society was founded on December 23, 1918.  Within several months, the membership had
reached forty-three, most of whom were university professors and personal acquaintances of either
Yoshino or Fukuda.  See Henry Dewitt Smith II, Japan’s First Student Radicals (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1972), 44-5.  
38) Iwamura, Zai-Nichi Cho¯senjin to Nihon Ro¯do¯sha Kaikyu¯, 23-4. 
39) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt dai 3,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 106-8.  Tokyo Asahi
Shinbun 東京朝日新聞, 21 March 1919; quoted in Kang Tongjin 姜東鎮, Nihon Genronkai to Cho¯sen [日
本言論界と朝鮮 Japanese Press and Korea], (Tokyo: Hosei Daigaku Shuppankai, 1984), 174-5.  
40) Ibid.
41) Naimusht Keihokyoku, ‘Chtsenjin no O¯rai, Tsrshin, Kaigt tt ni kanshi Chri gata no ken imei
tsrtatsu’[‘朝鮮人の往来、通信、会合等に関シ注意方ノ件依命通牒 A Cautionary Note concerning
the Movement, Communication, and Meeting of Koreans in Japan’], in Cho¯sen, vol. 2, 28-9.  
42) Naimusht, ed., ‘Zai-Nichi Chtsenjin Torishimari no Naimusht tt Tsrtatsu,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 36-7. 
43) Official anxieties over Koreans were reflected in their initial response to the assassination of Prime
105
Minister Hara Takashi 原敬 at the Tokyo Railway Station in November 1921.  Nakaoka Kon’ichi 中岡
艮一, who stabbed Hara to death, stated in his work that the detectives who arrested him assumed that
he was a Korean.  Nakaoka Kon’ichi, Gokust 13 nen [獄窓十三年 Thirteen Years of Prison Windows].
Quoted in Kang, Kanto Daishinsai, 52.  
44) Chtsengun Sambtbu [朝鮮軍参謀部 the General Staff of the Imperial Army in Korea], ‘Stjt no
Gen’in oyobi Ttchi jt Chri subeki ken ni tsuite: Naichi Ryrgakusei no Taigr oyobi Shidt’ [‘騒擾ノ原
因及朝鮮ノ統治上注意スヘキ件ニ就テ：内地留学生ノ待遇及指導 Concerning the Causes of the
Disturbances and Other Issues relating to the Administration of Korea which Needs Special Attention:
Treatment and Instruction of Korean Students in Japan’], in Cho¯sen, vol. 2, 651-2.  
45) Ibid.  Similar suggestions were made by Ishizaka Kameharu 石坂亀治, a Christian who visited Korea
immediately after the independence demonstrations.  See Ishizaka Kameharu 石坂亀治, ‘Chtsen Stjt
Jiken wo ronzu’ [‘朝鮮騒擾事件を論ず Descriptions of the Korean Disturbance’], in Cho¯sen, vol. 2,
638-9.  
46) In response to the Korean independence movement in 1919, Prime Minister Hara Takashi made
drastic adjustments in Japan’s policy toward Korea.  Hara, while sending additional troops to Korea to
suppress the independence movement, appointed Admiral Saitt Makoto as the new Governor-
General and prompted him to replace military rule with cultural rule.  Under the administration of the
new Governor-General Saitt, military police were replaced by civilian police and the publishing of
Korean newspapers and magazines was permitted under strict government censorship. Hara Takashi
(Hara Keiichirt 原奎一郎, ed.), Hara Takashi Nikki 5 [原敬日記 5 Diaries of Hara Takashi, vol. 5],
(Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppansha, 1965), 125-6.  Andrew C. Nahm, Introduction to Korean History and
Culture (NJ: Hollym, 1993), 188.  
47) Chtsen Sttokufu Gakumukyoku [朝鮮総督府学務局 Government-General of Chtsen Educational
Affairs Bureau], ed., ‘Zai-Naichi Chtsen Gakusei Jtkyt’ [‘在日朝鮮学生状況 General Conditions of
Korean Students in Japan’], in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 299-300.  Also see Abe, ‘Kaiht mae Nihon Ryrgaku no
Shiteki Tenkai Katei to sono Tokushitsu,’ 33, 35-8.  
48) Abe, ‘Kaiht mae Nihon Ryrgaku no Shiteki Tenkai Katei to sono Tokushitsu,’ 46- 8.  
49) An increase in the number of government-sponsored students in Japan was accomplished by (1)
reducing the amount of student grants by nearly 50%, (2) by extending the selection process to include
students already studying in Japan at their own expense, and (3) by stopping sponsoring students for
their fare, living expenses, and medical fees.  See Abe, ‘Kaiht mae Nihon Ryrgaku no Shiteki Tenkai
Katei to sono Tokushitsu,’ 51.  The relaxation of the regulations concerning Korean students in Japan
was also reflected in a rapid increase of the number of self-financed students.  The number increased
644 to 3,168 between 1919 and 1922.  See ibid., 50.  
50) Italics added.  Chtsen Sttokufu Gakumukyoku, ed., ‘Zai-Naichi Chtsen Gakusei Jtkyt,’ in ZCKSS,
vol. 1, 299-300.  The Office of Korean Student Supervisor in Tokyo can be traced back to 1906, when
the Korean government appointed Han Chiyu 韓致愈 as the supervisor of Korean students in Japan.
See Abe, ‘Kaiht mae Nihon Ryrgaku no Shiteki Tenkai Katei to sono Tokushitsu,’ 32.  
51) Chtsen Sttokufu Gakumukyoku, ed., ‘Zai-Naichi Chtsen Gakusei Jtkyt,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 300.
Italics added.  In many Japanese official documents and newspaper articles, the term disturbance was
used to refer to the March First Movement.  See, for example, Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed.,
‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt dai 3,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 98-106; Taisho Nyu¯su Jiten, vol. 4, 439-53.  
52) See, for example, Jiji Shimpo¯ 時事新報, 9 February 1919, 16 February 1919, and Ho¯ritsu 法律, 13
February 1919, 18 February 1919; quoted in Taisho Nyu¯su Jiten, vol. 4, 439.  
53) See Baldwin, ‘The March First Movement: Korean Challenge and Japanese Response,’ 84-96.
Yamabe, Nihon To¯chi ka no Cho¯sen, 93-7.  
54) Osaka Mainichi Shinbun大阪毎日新聞, 4 March 1919; quoted in Taisho Nyu¯su Jiten, vol. 4, 441-2.  
55) Osaka Asahi Shinbun大阪朝日新聞, 8 March 1919; quoted in Taisho Nyu¯su Jiten, vol. 4, 445-6.  
56) Ibid.  Italics added.  
57) Keijo¯ Nippo¯ 京城日報, 7 March 1919; quoted in Cho¯sen, vol. 2, 664.  
58) Ibid.  Italics added.  
59) Ibid.  
60) Quoted in Kang, Nihon Genronkai to Cho¯sen, 221.  The date of the publication was not provided.  
106
61) Osaka Asahi Shinbun, 3 March 1919.  Quoted in Kang, Nihon Genronkai to Cho¯sen, 165.  
62) Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun東京日日新聞, 7 March 1919; quoted in Kang, Nihon Genronkai to Cho¯sen, 165.  
63) Cho¯sen 朝鮮, 7 March 1919; quoted in Taisho Nyu¯su Jiten, vol. 4, 443.  Also see similar newspaper
articles which are cited in Kang, Nihon Genronkai to Cho¯sen, 165-7, 174-6, and Taisho Nyu¯su Jiten, vol. 4,
443-50.   
64) Hara, Hara Takashi Nikki, vol. 5, 137.
65) Tokyo Nichinichi, 4 September 1919; quoted in Kang, Nihon Genronkai to Cho¯sen, 226.
66) Ibid.
67) Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, 4 September 1919; quoted in Kang, Nihon Genronkai to Cho¯sen, 226.    
68) Yorozuchtht萬朝報, 4 September 1919; quoted in Kang, Nihon Genronkai to Cho¯sen, 227.    
69) Pak, Cho¯sen Dokuritsu Undo¯ no Kesshi, vol. 1, 186-94.  Also see Yamabe, ‘San Ichi Undt ni tsuite (1),’ 2.
Yamabe Kentart, ‘San Ichi Undt ni tsuite (2)’ [‘三一運動について(2) On the Uprising for
Independence in Korea on March 1, 1919, (2)’], Rekishigaku Kenkyu¯, vol. 185 ( July 1955), 18.  Yamabe
argues that members of the Japanese fire brigades in Hamhcng attacked Korean demonstrators from
the evening of March 2 to the following morning.  As a result, approximately 700 Koreans were
injured.  
70) Pak, Cho¯sen Dokuritsu Undo¯ no Kesshi, vol. 1, 186-94.
71) Keijo¯ Nippo¯, 25 March 1919; quoted in Cho¯sen, vol. 2, 667. 
72) Chtsen Sttokufu Keimukyoku [朝鮮総督府警務局], ed., ‘Zai-Kyt Chtsenjin Jtkyt’ [‘在京朝鮮人状況
Conditions of Koreans Residing in Tokyo’], in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 145-6.  Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka,
ed., ‘Taisho 14 nen chr ni okeru Zairyr Chtsenjin no Jtkyt’ [‘大正一四年中ニ於ケル在留朝鮮人ノ状
況 Conditions of Koreans in Japan in 1925’], in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 158-9.
73) From Shanghai, Manchuria and the United States, Korean envoys were dispatched to the Paris Peace
Conference.  Only Kim Kyushik 金奎植, a representative of the Korean Provisional Government in
Shanghai, reached Paris in time.  The Peace Conference failed, however, to discuss the issue of Korean
independence, nor was the principle of national self-determination applied to Korea.  See Cho¯sen, vol.
2, 82-7.  Ku, Korea under Colonialism, 37-45.  Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Zai-Kyt Chtsen
Ryrgakusei Gaikyt,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 326-7.
74) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt dai 3,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 87-8.  Naimusht
Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Taisho 14 nen chr ni okeru Zairyr Chtsenjin no Jtkyt,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1,
158, 181-2.
75) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Gaikyt dai 3,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 104-5.
76) Ibid., 105.   
77) Chtsen Sttokufu Keimukyoku, ed., ‘Zai-Kyt Chtsenjin Jtkyt,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 144-5.  Naimusht
Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Kinkyt Gaikyt,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 124.
78) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Kinkyt Gaikyt’ [“朝鮮人近況概況 A Recent General
View of Koreans’], in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 123.  This source also cited Korean students who gave speeches
urging social revolution at a meeting of the Kosumosu Kurabu in June 1920.  See ibid., 124.
79) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Kinkyt Gaikyt,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 124.   
80) O¯sugi Sakae 大杉栄, O¯sugi Sakae Zenshu¯ dai 3 kan [大杉栄全集第三巻 The Complete Works of O¯sugi
Sakae, vol. 3], (Tokyo: Sekai Bunko, 1973), 386-7.    
81) Yamakawa Hitoshi 山川均 (Yamakawa Kikue 山川菊枝 and Sakisaka Itsurt 向坂逸郎, eds.),
Yamakawa Hitoshi Jiden [山川均自伝 Autobiography of Yamakawa Hitoshi], (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,
1961), 389-90.
82) O¯sugi, O¯sugi Sakae Zenshu¯ dai 3 kan, 386-90.
83) Ibid., 396-401.  Also see Thomas A. Stanley, O¯sugi Sakae: Anarchist in the Taisho¯ Japan: The Creativity of
the Ego (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 134.  The extent to which the meetings in
Shanghai effectively strengthened solidarity between Korean radicals and their Japanese counterparts
is open to question.  In his autobiography O¯sugi indicated that his link with the communist group
within the Korean Provisional Government ceased shortly after his visit to Shanghai.  See O¯sugi, O¯sugi
Sakae Zenshu¯, vol. 3, 396-401.  Pak Yel 朴烈, a Korean anarchist leader in Japan, also “saw no
possibility of a tie between the Comintern and O¯sugi, because the latter had not only retained his
anarchist views but had even asserted that, if there were outside interference in Japanese affairs, he
107
would not accept aid.”  Quoted in Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, Communism in Korea, part I:
the Movement, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 31.  Neither O¯sugi nor Scalapino
provides the Chinese titles of these O¯sugi met in Shanghai.     
84) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Kinkyt Gaikyt,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 125.  Also see
Scalapino, Communism in Korea, part I, 30; O¯sugi, O¯sugi Sakae Zenshu¯, vol. 3, 400-1.  
85) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Chtsenjin Kinkyt Gaikyt,” in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 123  Naimusht
Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Zai-Kyt Chtsen Ryrgakusei Gaikyt,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 325.
86) Ibid.
87) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Zai-Kyt Chtsen Ryrgakusei Gaikyt,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 325.  
88) Ibid., 325-6.  Further demonstrations took place at Ueno, Hibiya Park and the Korean YMCA on
November 11, (the opening day of the Washington Conference), while there were student strikes at
schools for several days.  See Ibid., 326.  
89) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Taisho 15 nen chr ni okeru Zairyr Chtsenjin no Jtkyt’ [‘大正十
五年中ニ於ケル在留朝鮮人ノ状況 Conditions of Koreans in Japan in 1926’], in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 209;
Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Zai-Kyt Chtsen Ryrgakusei Gaikyt,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 327.  
90) Chtsen Sttokufu Keimukyoku, ed., ‘Zai-Kyt Chtsenjin Jtkyt,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 139.  Horiuchi
Minoru 堀内稔, ‘Zai-Nichi Chtsenjin Anpkizumu Rtdt Undt (Kaihtmae)-Chtsen Ttkt Rtdt
Dtmeikai to Chtsen Jiyr Rtdtsha Kumiai’ [‘在日朝鮮人アナーキズム労働運動 (解放前)―朝鮮東興
労働同盟会と朝鮮自由労働者組合 Anarcho-Labour Movement of Koreans in Japan (Before 1945)-
Ttkt League of Korean Labour and Korean Liberal Labour Union’], Zai-Nichi Cho¯senjinshi Kenkyu¯, vol.
16, no. 2 (October 1986), 39, 54.  
91) Chtsen Sttokufu Keimukyoku, ed., ‘Zai-Kyt Chtsenjin Jtkyt,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 144.  
92) Iwamura, Zai-Nichi Cho¯senjin to Nihon Ro¯do¯sha Kaikyu¯, 74.  
93) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Taisho 15 nen chr ni okeru Zairyr Chtsenjin no Jtkyt,’ in
ZCKSS, vol. 1, 209.
94) Quoted in ibid., 74-5.  
95) Shihtsht, ed., ‘Naichi ni okeru Chtsenjin to sono Hanzai ni tsuite,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 298.   
96) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Taisho 14 nen chr ni okeru Zairyr Chtsenjin no Jtkyt,’ in
ZCKSS, vol. 1, 162.  Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Zai-Kyt Chtsen Ryrgakusei Gaikyt,’ in
ZCKSS, vol. 1, 333.  
97) Xu Shikai, 許世偕, ‘Boku Retsu Jiken —— Shiitageraretamono no Hangyaku’ [‘朴烈事件 —— 虐げられた
ものの反逆 Incident of Pak Yel-Rebellion of the Oppressed’], in Wagatsuma Sakae 我妻栄, ed.,  Nihon
Seiji Saiban Shiroku 3: Taisho [日本政治裁判史録第三巻：大正 Historical Documents Concerning
Political Trials in Japan, vol. 3: Taisho Period], (Tokyo: Daiichi Htki Shuppankai, 1977), 380-1.
98) Ibid., 381.  This organization is also known as Righteous Blood Unit (義血団) or Fist Unit (手拳団).
See KDJ, vol. 12, 704.  
99) Xu, ‘Boku Retsu Jiken,’ in Nihon Seiji Saiban Shiroku, 3, 384.
100) Ibid.  According to government reports, members of the Company of Malcontents held meetings four
times between May and August 1923 in which they discussed how to encourage popular and labour
movements in Korea.  They also planned an attack on Kim Tongwen 金 元, an editor of the Tonga
Ilbo東亜日報 who was alleged to be pro-Japanese.
101) Ibid., 386-90.  The Unit of Righteous Fighters was organized in Manchuria in November 1919.  The
principal objective of this group was the assassination of officials of the Government-General of
Chtsen, the emperor of Japan and officials of the Japanese government, and pro-Japanese Korean
detectives.  See ibid., 388.   
102) Ibid.
103) Tokyo Nichinichi, 20 May 1922; Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, 1 July 1922; quoted in Taisho Nyu¯su Jiten, vol. 5,
424-5.  
104) Xu, ‘Boku Retsu Jiken,’ 385.  Pak Yel and Kaneko Fumiko were later indicted for high treason and
were sentenced to death on March 25, 1926.  The first Wakatsuki Reijirt Cabinet 若槻礼次郎 (30
January 1926-20 April 1927), however, commuted the sentences to life imprisonment in the following
month.  See ibid., 399.  
105) Tokyo Nichinichi, 4 October 1920; quoted in Taisho Nyu¯su Jiten, vol. 4, 432.  In September and October
108
of 1920, mounted bandits raided Hunchun and the Japanese Legation in the region.  Recent studies,
however, argue that the leaders of these bandits were Japanese collaborators.  See, for example, Kang
Teksang 姜徳相, ‘Shiryt Kaisetsu’ [‘資料解説 Comments on Materials’], in Kang Teksang, ed.,
Gendaishi Shiryo¯ 28: Cho¯sen 4 [現代史資料第二十八巻：朝鮮 4 Materials in Contemporary History,
vol. 28: Korea, no. 4], (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobt, 1972), viii-xi (hereafter referred to as Cho¯sen, vol. 4).
106) Jiji Shimpo¯, 9 October 1920; quoted in Taisho Nyu¯su Jiten, vol. 4, 434-5.  
107) Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, 8 October 1920.  Quoted in Taisho Nyu¯su Jiten, vol. 4, 433.  On October 7,
1920, the Japanese government decided to send troops to the Chientao region.  According to Japanese
official reports, the number of Koreans killed by the Japanese forces during the military expedition,
which lasted until December of that year, was 522, while a Korean source estimated 3,128.  See Dai 19
Shidan Shireibu [第十九師団司令部 The Headquarters of the Nineteenth Division], ed., ‘Kanto Jiken
Sen-Shijin Shishtsha Shirabe’ [‘間島事件鮮支人死傷者調 Reports of Korean and Chinese Casualties at
the time of the Chientao Incident’], in Cho¯sen, vol. 4, 520-43; Ku, Korea under Colonialism, 275.   
108) Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, 1 July 1922; quoted in Taisho Nyu¯su Jiten, vol. 5, 424-5.  
109) Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Taisho 14 nen chr ni okeru Zairyr Chtsenjin no Jtkyt’ in
ZCKSS, vol. 1, 182-3.  Also see Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, 1 March 1921; Tokyo Asahi, March 1, 1921;
quoted in Taisho Nyu¯su Jiten, vol. 5, 586-7.  Min Wenshik was the president of the National Association
(国民協会), a pro-Japanese organization in Korea.  Min arrived in Tokyo in February 1921 and
presented a petition to the Japanese Diet calling for the extension of the political franchise to Korea.
Although this attempt failed, Koreans who resided in Japan were enfranchized under the Universal
Suffrage Law of 1925.  Naimusht Keihokyoku Hoanka, ed., ‘Taisht 14 nen chr ni okeru Zairyr
Chtsenjin no Jtkyt,’ in ZCKSS, vol. 1, 182-3.  
110) Akaike Atsushi 赤池濃, ‘Daishinsai ttji ni okeru Shokan’ [‘大震災当時に於ける所感　My Thoughts
on the Time of the Great Kanto Earthquake’], in Jikei [自警 Vigilante], vol. 51 (November 1923);
quoted in Kang Teksang 姜徳相 and Kcm Pyengdong 琴秉洞, ed., Gendaishi Shiryo¯  6: Kanto Daishinsai
to Cho¯senjin [現代史資料第六巻：関東大震災と朝鮮人 Source Materials on Contemporary History,
vol. 6: Great Kanto Earthquake and Koreans], (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobt, 1963), 9-11 (hereafter referred
to as Kanto Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin).    
111) Osaka Asahi Shinbun, 5 October 1923; quoted in Kang Teksang 姜徳相, Kanto Daishinsai [関東大震災
The Great Kanto Earthquake], (Tokyo: Chrt Ktronsha, 1975), 20.  The motion to introduce Martial
Law was withdrawn during the afternoon of September 1, 1923 owing to strong opposition within the
government.  However, amendments were made to the bill as a result of Akaike’s strong arguments
and Martial Law was imposed on the following day.   See Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, 9 October 1923; quoted
in Kang, Kanto Daishinsai, 17. 
112) See Kanto Daishinsai Gojusshrnen Chtsenjin Giseisha Chtsa Tsuitt Jigyt Jikkt Iinkai [関東大震災六
十周年朝鮮人犠牲者調査追悼事業実行委員会 The Standing Committee for Investigative and
Memorial Enterprizes, Fifty-Year Memorial for Korean Victims of the Great Kanto Earthquake], ed.,
Kakusareteita Rekishi: Kanto Daishinsai to Saitama no Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu Jiken [かくされていた歴
史：関東大震災と埼玉の朝鮮人虐殺事件 The Hidden History: The Great Kanto Earthquake and the
Massacre of Koreans in Saitama], (Omiya: Niccht Kytkai Saitama Rengtkai, 1974), 61 and 71.
113) Kokumin Shinbun国民新聞, 14 October 1923.  This is taken from an article of Uesugi Shingo 上杉慎吾,
‘Keisatsu Kanken ni Kaitt o Motomu’ [‘警察官憲に回答を求む Requesting a Definite Response from
Police Officials’], quoted in Kanto Daishinsai to Chtsenjin, 148.  Newspaper and magazine articles did
not paly a major role in circulating the anti-Korean rumors among the Japanese public in the Kanto
area partly because the earthquake and the subsequent fires prevented the immediate restoration of
communications system in devastated areas and partly because the government exercised control over
the publication of newspaper and magazine articles which were considered to be opposed to its
handling of the Korean affair.  On September 3, the Home Ministry Police Affairs Bureau notified
Japan’s newspapers that since any rumors about Korean rioting would only increase social unrest, the
publication of articles concerning Koreans would culminate in a ban on the sale and distribution of the
offending newspaper.  See Kanto Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 332-3.  It was not until October 20, that the
Japanese government lifted censorship on publication of newspaper and magazine articles dealing with
the Korean issue.
109
114) Home Ministry, ed., ‘Shinsai ni tomonau Chtsenjin Hogo Shrytjin’in Shirabe’ [‘震災に伴う朝鮮人保
護収容人員調 Studies of the Number of Protected Koreans at the time of the Earthquake’], quoted in
Kcm Pyengdong, ed., Kanto Daishinsai Cho¯senjin Gyakusatsu Mondai Kankei Shiryo¯ II: Cho¯ senjin
Gyakusatsu Kanren Kancho¯ Shiryo¯ [関東大震災朝鮮人虐殺問題関係資料：朝鮮人虐殺関連官庁資料
Historical Materials Concerning the Massacre of the Koreans after the Great Kanto Earthquake, vol. 2:
Official Materials Concerning the Massacre of Koreans], (Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobt, 1991), 23-6.      
115) Kanto Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 264-5.  On September 3, Pak Yel and other radical student leaders were
housed in the Setagaya 世田谷, Yodobashi 淀橋 and other police stations in Tokyo.  See Xu, “Boku
Retsu Jiken,’ 379-411.  Iwamura, Zai-Nichi Cho¯senjin to Nihon Ro¯do¯sha Kaikyu¯, 92.        
116) Chiba ken ni okeru Kanto Daishinsai to Chtsenjin Giseisha Tsuitt Chtsa Jikkt Iinkai [千葉県におけ
る関東大震災と朝鮮人犠牲者追悼・調査実行委員会 A Memorial Survey Executive Committee for
Korean Victims in Chiba Prefecture at the time of the Great Kanto Earthquake], ed., Iwarenaku
Korosareta Hitobito [いわれなく殺された人びと The Unjustifiable Slaughter of Persons], (Tokyo: Aoki
Shoten, 1983), 116-31.
117) Yoshino Sakuzt 吉野作造, ‘Chtsenjin Gyakusatsu Jiken ni tsuite’ [‘朝鮮人虐殺事件に就いて An
Account of the Massacre of Koreans’], in Kanto Daishinsai to Cho¯senjin, 364-5.  
110
